Was Mossad Sleeping Before The Hamas Attack?

Article written by VOLF.TV TEAM , content strategy by Amit Anand and produced by Manjeet Kumar. 

Why Mossad’s Defenses Proved Ineffective Against Hamas

In a shocking turn of events on October 6th, thousands of Israelis found themselves abruptly awakened by sirens blaring across multiple cities. The Palestinian group Hamas had launched a daring assault on Israeli territory, unleashing approximately 5,000 rockets from Gaza and orchestrating an audacious land-sea-air offensive. This assault featured Hamas militants infiltrating towns, kibbutz communities, and even an open-air music festival, leaving Israeli citizens in a state of panic, hiding in their homes, as reports of violence and terror unfolded.

The scale and complexity of this Hamas assault were unlike any Israel had witnessed since the 1973 Yom Kippur War. Remarkably, it succeeded despite the combined efforts of Israel’s two renowned security and intelligence services – Shin Bet and Mossad. The attacks, resulting in a significant loss of life, have now cast a shadow over Mossad’s long-established reputation.

Understanding Mossad’s Structure and Operations

Mossad, boasting a substantial annual budget of $3 billion and a workforce of 7,000 personnel, stands as the second-largest espionage agency in the Western world, following closely behind the CIA. At the helm of Mossad, David “Dadi” Barnea succeeded Yossi Cohen as its chief in June 2021, through a highly secretive selection process known to only a few within the Israeli Prime Minister’s office, the agency itself, and the Civil Service Advisory Committee responsible for vetting and approving such appointments.

Although Mossad’s internal structure is largely shrouded in secrecy, its operations span a wide array of departments, each with a distinct focus:

• The Collections Department stands as the agency’s largest division, responsible for conducting espionage operations across the globe.
• The Political Action and Liaison Department is tasked with political activities and collaboration with foreign intelligence services in nations where Israel lacks formal diplomatic relations.
• The Special Operations Division, also referred to as Metsada, handles highly sensitive missions such as assassinations, sabotage, paramilitary actions, and psychological warfare.
• The LAP (Lohamah Psichologit) Department oversees psychological warfare, propaganda, and deception operations.
• The Research Department produces various forms of intelligence, including daily situation reports, weekly summaries, and comprehensive monthly reports.
• The Technology Department focuses on developing advanced technologies to support Mossad’s operational endeavors.

Mossad’s Recent Setback and Its Implications

Israel has earned a reputation for its remarkable success in thwarting external threats, which makes the recent failure to anticipate and prevent the Hamas attack all the more perplexing. Several pertinent questions have arisen in the wake of the assault. How did Hamas manage to stockpile thousands of rockets and missiles in close proximity to Israel without detection by Israeli intelligence? Moreover, why did Israel’s dependable Iron Dome missile defense system fail to intercept all of the incoming projectiles from Gaza?

Despite the presence of advanced security measures along the Gaza-Israel border, including surveillance cameras, ground-motion sensors, and regular military patrols, Hamas successfully executed its infiltration. In shocking visuals that circulated on social media, a bulldozer tore down a segment of what had appeared to be an impenetrable “iron wall” demarcating the Israel-Gaza border.

Hamas militants effectively breached the fence, cutting through the wire, and arrived on Israeli soil by sea using boats and paragliders. The intricacy of the attack, the planning extending over several months, and the impressive level of coordination among the attackers have raised serious questions about how Mossad, renowned for its intelligence-gathering capabilities, could have failed to detect this impending threat.

The situation is being likened to the 9/11 attacks in the United States, which sent shockwaves throughout the global intelligence community. Curiously, Mossad’s purported lapse in this scenario raises critical concerns, as it is often considered one of the most powerful and feared intelligence agencies globally. Mossad is widely recognized for its covert operations and its ability to carry out missions deep within enemy territory discreetly.

One potential factor contributing to Mossad’s failure could be its heavy reliance on electronic intelligence (ELINT). Mossad excels at monitoring mobile phones, landlines, radio sets, and radar frequencies, with the use of sophisticated tools like the Pegasus spyware. However, this approach becomes less effective when adversaries avoid modern communication devices and social media.

In the modern realm of intelligence agencies, a strong emphasis is placed on Human Intelligence (HUMINT). This entails field agents who infiltrate terrorist networks, often without the enemy’s knowledge. The absence of electronic communication and a social media presence among Hamas leaders may have left Mossad in the dark.

Another potential explanation for Mossad’s failure is the possibility that Hamas received external assistance, perhaps from a powerful nation. The synchronized land, sea, and air assault suggests that extensive training took place, possibly on foreign soil. Hamas militants infiltrated Israel using paragliders, a skill that cannot be acquired overnight or within the confined space of the Gaza Strip. The training might have occurred in a friendly country, such as Iran or Lebanon, significantly complicating Mossad’s ability to detect and preempt the attack.

A recent viral video from India revealed the potential use of drones for infiltrating individuals, indicating new methods of infiltration. It is worth noting that Lashkar-e-Taiba, a terrorist organization operating from Pakistan, has been suspected of training terrorists in drone usage for incursions into India. Given Pakistan’s support for Palestine and its hostile stance toward Israel, it is not inconceivable that Pakistan might have played a role in training Hamas militants.

One speculative reason for Mossad’s failure is that its agents were preoccupied with the Yom Kippur festival. However, the attack occurred a day before the holiday, and the extensive planning required suggests that Hamas had been preparing for a considerable period. This incident serves as a stark reminder that security agencies must remain vigilant, even during holidays, to prevent lapses in national security.

In conclusion, the failure to anticipate and prevent the Hamas attack on Israeli soil was a significant setback to Mossad’s long-standing reputation. While the precise reasons for this failure remain unclear, it underscores the challenges intelligence agencies face when dealing with adversaries who do not rely on electronic communication and underscores the importance of human intelligence and international collaboration in modern intelligence operations.